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This article attempts to question modes of sharing and watching to rethink political subjectivity beyond that which is
enabled and enforced by the current data regime. It identifies and examines a ‘shareveillant’ subjectivity: a form config-
ured by the sharing and watching that subjects have to withstand and enact in the contemporary data assemblage.
Looking at government open and closed data as case studies, this article demonstrates how ‘shareveillance’ produces an
anti-political role for the public. In describing shareveillance as, after Jacques Rancie`re, a distribution of the (digital)
sensible, this article posits a politico-ethical injunction to cut into the share and flow of data in order to arrange a more
enabling assemblage of data and its affects. In order to interrupt shareveillance, this article borrows a concept from
E´douard Glissant and his concern with raced otherness to imagine what a ‘right to opacity’ might mean in the digital
context. To assert this right is not to endorse the individual subject in her sovereignty and solitude, but rather to imagine
a collective political subjectivity and relationality according to the important question of what it means to ‘share well’
beyond the veillant expectations of the state.
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Two questions dominate current debates at the inter-
section of privacy, governance, security, and transpar-
ency: How much, and what kind of data should citizens
have to share with surveillant states? And: How much
data from government departments should states share
with citizens? Yet, these issues are rarely expressed in
terms of ‘sharing’ in the way that I will be doing in this
article. More often, when thought in tandem with the
digital, ‘sharing’ is used in reference to either free trials
of software (‘shareware’); the practice of peer-to-peer
ﬁle sharing; platforms that facilitate the pooling, bor-
rowing, swapping, renting, or selling of resources,
skills, and assets that have come to be known as the
‘sharing economy’; or the business of linking and liking
on social media, which invites us to share our feelings,
preferences, thoughts, interests, photographs, articles,
and web links. Sharing in the digital context has been
framed as a form of exchange, then, but also commu-
nication and distribution (see John, 2013; Wittel, 2011).
In order to understand the politics of open and
opaque government data practices, which either share
with citizens or ask citizens to share, I will extend exist-
ing commentaries on the distributive qualities of shar-
ing by drawing on Jacques Rancie`re’s notion of the
‘distribution of the sensible’ (2004a) – a settlement
that determines what is visible, audible, sayable,
knowable and what share or role we each have within
it. In the process, I articulate ‘sharing’ with ‘veillance’
(veiller ‘to watch’ is from the Latin vigilare, from vigil,
‘watchful’) to turn the focus from prevalent ways of
understanding digital sharing towards a form of con-
temporary subjectivity. What I call ‘shareveillance’ – a
state in which we are always already sharing; indeed, in
which any relationship with data is only made possible
through a conditional idea of sharing – produces an
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anti-politicised public caught between diﬀerent data
practices.
I will argue that both open and opaque government
data initiatives involve, albeit diﬀerently pitched, forms
of sharing and veillance. Government practices that
share data with citizens involve veillance because they
call on citizens to monitor and act upon that data – we
are envisioned (‘veiled’ and hailed) as auditing and
entrepreneurial subjects. Citizens have to monitor
the state’s data, that is, or they are expected to innovate
with it and make it proﬁtable. Data sharing therefore
apportions responsibility without power. It watches
citizens watching the state, delimiting the ways in
which citizens can engage with that data and, therefore,
the scope of the political per se.
Opaque government data practices (practices that we
cannot see through, that are not readily knowable),
such as those enacted by the NSA and GCHQ via
the PRISM, TEMPORA, and XKeyscore surveillance
programs as revealed by Edward Snowden, produce
‘closed’ data. The main point about closed data in
relation to the state (and it is important to note at
the outset that the details would be diﬀerent for com-
mercial enterprises) is that it is withheld from general
access and circulation for reasons concerned with dip-
lomacy, stability, power play, or security.1 Despite the
sense of restriction, claim, and withholding here,
opaque government data practices still involve sharing,
however, not least because they require citizens to
(often unknowingly) ‘share’ data with the veillant
state in a way that renders them visible and trackable.
But we should not think of the positions carved out
for citizens in each conﬁguration as an oscillation
between agency and impotence. Nor is it quite right
to think of this as the ‘equiveillance’ diagnosed
by Steve Mann (2013) – an evenly poised balance
between surveillant and sousveillant forces. Rather,
shareveillance constitutes the anti-politicised role the
dataﬁed neoliberal security state imagines for its
public; the latter is conﬁgured more as either a ﬂat
dataset or a series of individual auditor–entrepreneurs
than as a force with political potential. For those of us
unhappy with the political realm being delimited and
politics disavowed in this way, we will need to experi-
ment with ways to interrupt shareveillent subjectivity.
A radical critique of ubiquitous and default ‘sharing’
in the digital context is clearly necessary, but I also
want to seek out opportunities to salvage this concept
in order to imagine a collective political subjectivity
that could emerge from within this socio-technical
moment (rather than pitching one against it). In this
article, then, I will propose that we can interrupt share-
veillant subjectivity by claiming not a right to access
more data or a right to privacy, but a ‘right to opacity’
(Glissant, 1997). In the context of shareveillance,
I am imagining this right as the demand not to be
reduced to, and interact with, data in ways delimited
by the state; to resist the terms of engagement set by
the two faces of shareveillance (i.e., sharing data with
the state and monitoring that shared data). In order
to make this argument, I will appropriate the term
‘sharing’ by calling on the etymological roots of ‘to
share’ – particularly the Old English for ‘portion’
(scearu) which points towards a cutting, shearing, a
part, or division. I will posit a right to opacity that
cuts into and apart veillant formations and data distri-
butions through various tactics such as hacking, data
obfuscation, decentralisation, encryption, anonymity,
and anarchic algorithms. Accepting shareveillance
means accepting a ‘distribution of the sensible’ that is
not based on equality, necessitating a diﬀerent, more
ethical distribution, cut, or share by way of a response
on our part. Exploring a right to opacity in the face of
shareveillance can politicise the concept of ‘sharing’ by
envisioning it as an equitable, ethical cut.
Sharing digitally
Today, sharing with regard to the digital conjures
up the range of platforms and apps that facilitate the
harnessing of surplus time, skills, goods, and capacities
known as the sharing economy. But this is only the
latest incarnation of sharing’s articulation within the
digital context. Nicholas John (2013) lobbied for shar-
ing to be considered as a keyword for understanding
digital culture, in the tradition of Raymond Williams
(1976). Subsequently, ‘sharing’ is included in Culture
Digitally’s ‘Digital Keywords’.2 John’s contribution to
that project mentions sharing in terms of three exam-
ples (2014). First, he calls on computer time-sharing,
which was developed during the late 1950s and early
1960s to make eﬃcient use of expensive processor
time. Second, John includes ﬁle sharing, which
informed the U.S. Department of Defense’s develop-
ment of ARPAnet, and was strengthened by the intro-
duction of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) in 1973 based on the network guid-
ing packets to their destination. Subsequent protocols
such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol develop the concept
that networks can facilitate direct connections and
transfers between hosts. Recent peer-to-peer ﬁle-shar-
ing techniques present the latest evolution of such logic
(see Johnson et al., 2008: 2). Third, John mentions ‘data
sharing’ as the term that has, after Snowden, come to
denote the simple transportation of data. Though all
three of these make an appearance, John chooses to
focus on a fourth instance: one embedded in the logic
of web 2.0. In this discussion, he turns to the way in
which social networking sites have appropriated the
2 Big Data & Society
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term ‘sharing’ to refer to the imperative and logic of
communication and distribution. Because posting, link-
ing, and liking are all termed ‘sharing’ on social net-
working sites, John claims that, in eﬀect, ‘[s]haring is
the fundamental and constitutive activity of Web 2.0’
(2013: 176).
In addition to acting in the service of communica-
tion, sharing data also has to be understood as a form
of distribution. Human and non-human actors are
involved in the dissemination of data, documents,
photos, web links, feelings, and news across space and
time. Such an obvious point is worth making because it
allows us to think beyond the dominant, morally
inﬂected imperative to share or connect with others in
a network through a confessional-communicative style,
towards circulation in a purely spatial sense (albeit one
with ethico-political implications). It might be useful
here to think about such a process as one of spatial
diﬀerentiation – a term borrowed from economics
that refers to the uneven dispersal of resources,
goods, and services. Diﬀerences in natural and human
resources lead to inequitable access to inputs and out-
puts. I want to retain this inﬂection – of inequality,
disparity – with the intention that it will open the
way for a broader discussion of the politics or ethics
of (data) veillance, distribution, and sharing, in the con-
text of the state rather than private platforms, in the
next section.
Distribution of the (digital) sensible
Whereas John’s use of the term ‘distribution’ points
towards the act of disseminating photos, ﬁles, videos,
etc. (2013: 176), I am going to draw on its appearance
in the lexicon of Jacques Rancie`re. Rancie`re’s Le
Partage du Sensible is translated as a sharing, partition,
division, and, more commonly, distribution of the sens-
ible. This distribution of the sensible is an aesthetico-
political settlement. It is, in Rancie`re’s words:
a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the
invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously
determines the place and the stakes of politics as a
form of experience. Politics revolves around what is
seen and what can be said about it, around who has
the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the
properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.
(2004a: 12–13)
Aesthetics for Rancie`re is a distributive regime deter-
mining what action, reaction, and thought is possible in
any given situation. It is political precisely because in
every ‘distribution of the sensible’ equality is either
undermined or aﬃrmed. A distribution determines
‘those who have a part in the community of citizens’
(Rancie`re, 2004a: 7); it ‘reveals who can have a share in
what is common to the community based on what they
do and on the time and space in which this activity
is performed [my emphasis]’ (Rancie`re, 2004a: 8).
Equality is enacted when those without part, the unrep-
resented, come to take part; those without a share, have
a share. In a process of subjectivisation,3 this involves
refuting the subject position one is allocated by the
system, and ﬁnding a position, as well as a name or
identity-in-relation that will enable full participation
and recognition – akin to the work the term ‘proletar-
iat’ once performed (Rancie`re, 1992). An instantiation
of politics based on equality, then, is when demands
for a new division and sharing of the social whole
are granted.
Such a conception can be helpful in the context of
open and opaque government digital data practices,
and the shareveillant subjectivity that connects them
(which I will come to below). It makes sense today to
include digital data in an understanding of the sensible
(that which can be seen, heard, touched, thought). Its
availability to a subject’s veillent capacities or range,
and the conditions of its visibility (to whom, in which
circumstances, to what ends) are usefully thought as
part of a particular distribution. In any encounter, we
can ask: ‘Who has a share of the data?’ and ‘What kind
of subjectivity is made more likely as a result of that
division and/or access?’ Before turning to discuss these
questions in terms of open and opaque government
data practices in more detail, I want to pause on the
logic of sharing as it pertains to the digital in general,
for through this I hope to demonstrate a technological
underpinning to the rise of shareveillance.
Sharing as protocological condition
Returning to John’s claim that ‘Sharing is the funda-
mental and constitutive activity of Web 2.0’ (2013: 176),
it is important to note that later, he goes further.
‘It could even be argued that [. . .] the entire internet
is fundamentally a sharing technology’ (179), he
writes, citing the importance of open source software
and programming languages and sharing economies of
production, in the development of websites based on
user-generated content. Likewise, Engin Isin and
Evelyn Ruppert claim that ‘the ubiquity of various
uses of digital trances has made data sharing the
norm’ (2015: 89). I want to slightly rephrase and shift
the emphasis of John’s assertion to suggest that sharing
can be conceived as the constitutive logic of the
Internet. Rather than focusing on what users do on
the Internet, then, I want to focus more on the idea
that sharing operates at a protocological level. My
use of this term here draws on Alexander Galloway’s
exposition of computer protocols as standards that
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‘govern how speciﬁc technologies are agreed to,
adopted, implemented, and ultimately used by people
around the world’ (2004: 7).
This is not intended as a utopian celebration of the
Internet’s open, or free, origins. Galloway, among
others, makes the error of such an assumption clear,
as he characterises the Internet as a technology marked
by control and hierarchies of enclosure. Rather, in
positing sharing as protocological, I want to imply
simply that the Internet’s grain is, ﬁrst and foremost,
‘stateless’ in the sense that programming intends: as a
lack of stored inputs. In other words, the basic archi-
tecture of the Internet does not automatically keep a
record of previous interactions, and so each interaction
request is handled based only on the information that
accompanies it. For example, the Internet’s fundamen-
tal method for sending data between computers,
IP, works by sending small chunks of data, ‘packets’,
that travel independently of each other. These discrete
packets are put together at an upper layer, by TCP, yet
IP itself operates without state. We can also look to
how the Web’s HTTP serves up requested pages but
does not ‘remember’ those requests. Such discrete com-
munications mean that no continuity is recorded.
As Tom Armitage points out, because the Internet’s
default architecture is open or stateless, it is very good
at sharing, but not so good at privacy and ownership.4
By this, he simply means that ‘implementing state, or
privacy, or ownership, or a pay wall, is eﬀort’.5 State is
a secondary level, patched onto a stateless system. This
is categorically not to say that the development and
design of the Internet was free from a proprietary
impetus, nor that ‘default’ architecture is not conscious
and intentional; but rather that to refrain from connect-
ing, and thus in a certain sense, sharing with any net-
work or user at all, at a purely technical level, is
something that has to be introduced in secondary
layers and mechanisms. It also follows that tracking a
user’s activity has to be imposed at a secondary level.
Netscape, for example, introduced the cookie – a by-
now ubiquitous text ﬁle that stores small amounts of
data associated with a domain. For as long as the
cookie has not expired, it will track the pages a user
visits and help build a user proﬁle (see Elmer, 2003).
In its stateless formations, before the ‘eﬀort’ to impose
statefulness, the Internet, then, can be conceptualised as
a technology of stateless, borderless, always already
sharing. I want to suggest that sharing (without track-
ing or remembering) in this instance is a rule condition-
ing the possibility of computers communicating with
each other at all.
However, introducing state, tracking user’s
online movements, say, foregrounds a diﬀerent kind
of ‘sharing’ – no longer one concerned with open
and non-accumulative peer-to-peer communication,
but rather a ‘sharing’ of the journey, searches, and
data transfers from one IP address or an individual
user with the web publisher and, often, third parties.
Indeed, tech companies like Facebook and Google use
the word ‘sharing’ when referring to the monetisation
of users’ data (see John, 2013). In Instagram’s 2013
Privacy Policy following its acquisition by Facebook,
for example, there is a section entitled ‘Sharing of your
Information’.6
This links protocol and proﬁts. Illegal and legal
entities want a share of our data. This would include
hackers should our data be interesting or proﬁtable
enough, able to overcome any data loss prevention
software and systems from ﬁrewalls to encryption. It
would also include trackers utilised by web publishers,
such as Doubleclick, that log the data we create
through our online activity to customise service and
advertising and sell it to third parties. Such trackers
do not often announce themselves to us unless we seek
them out through anti-tracking browser extensions
(like Ghostery) or forensic examination of user agree-
ments (which still do not list speciﬁc trackers used).
Many websites have multiple trackers – cookies and
beacons. Ironically, even website publishers that
employ trackers are themselves subject to ‘data leak-
age’ which ‘occurs when a brand, agency or ad tech
company collects data about a website’s audience and
subsequently uses that data without the initial pub-
lisher’s permission’ (McDermott, 2015). Such secre-
tions, the unintentional ‘sharing’ of already ‘shared’
data, also highlight the diﬃculties of not-sharing from
a diﬀerent perspective.
The idea of sharing as protocological is posited here
to emphasise the fact that speciﬁc modes of sharing and
not-sharing, as well as the particular distribution of the
(data) sensible, are determined by ideologically charged
dispositifs. As Galloway puts it: ‘protocol is how
technological control exists after decentralisation’
(2004: 8). Crucially, the conditions of sharing/not shar-
ing today inﬂect a subjectivity that makes a particular
call upon, and imposes a limitation to, the veillant and
agential capacities of citizens.
The sharing assemblage
Depending on our politics, we will be more or less
resistant to the sharing of our data in exchange for
security; depending on our willingness and time to
read the clauses in diﬀerent privacy policies, we might
be more or less cognizant of what it is, exactly, we are
sharing with private corporations; depending on how
much attention we paid to the details of the Snowden
revelations, we will have greater or lesser understanding
of the ways in which our communications and move-
ments can be monitored by the state. Regardless of the
4 Big Data & Society
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diﬀerentials in knowledge and politics, sharing, I want
to argue, has to be understood today not as a conscious
and conscientious act but as a key component of con-
temporary data subjectivity.
Data does not unproblematically belong to us in the
ﬁrst place in order for it then to be ‘shared’. Rather,
we are within a dynamic sharing assemblage: always
already sharing data with human or non-human
agents. I want to identify an ascendant shareveillant
subjectivity that is shaped by the play between openness
and enclosure. ‘Shareveillance’ is intended to capture
the condition of consuming shared data and producing
data to be shared in ways that produce a subject who is
at once surveillant and surveilled. To phrase it with a
slightly diﬀerent emphasis: the subject of shareveillance
is one who simultaneously works with data and on
whom the data works.
Sharing prevails as a standard of the system because
of the diﬃculties of un-sharing data and ‘eﬀort’ of safe-
guarding or rendering data proprietary. To take the
ﬁrst of these, it is clear that the ease and speed of copy-
ing digital data means that data already in circulation
cannot be revoked. Moreover, in the case of cloud stor-
age, or even back-ups to hard drives, replication of data
is the default. More than one copy of ﬁles often exists
on a hard drive, let alone in diﬀerent storage facilities.
It is also pertinent to point out that it makes little sense
to talk about an ‘original’ when it comes to digital data,
the consequence of which is that data is non-rivalrous
and thus sharing non-depleting. We could also look to
the way in which the use and re-use of diﬀerent datasets
for various applications makes it nonsensical to talk
about the un-sharing of data: once it is the life-blood
of various apps, bringing oxygen to a new economy, it
is being shared in multiple directions through various
media. We can detect, then, a propensity towards dupli-
cation, secretion, circulation, and sharing.
While I have pointed towards a distribution of the
digital sensible that would encompass private and
public, national and transnational entities, for the
remainder of this article, I want to focus on the ways
in which state forms of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ data feed
into such a distribution.
Open and closed government data
It is important to note from the outset that the labels
‘open’ and ‘closed’ are not essential, but relational,
adhering to particular moments in space and time.
When articulated to data, the identity of each, and
the binary opposition itself, are contingent upon the
political climate, the market, the security complex,
technological capacities, and the veillant conjuncture.
The tendency towards secretion identiﬁed above should
be enough to indicate the provisional nature of any
identiﬁcation of data as ‘closed’. Likewise, because of
the inherently opaque nature of much ‘open’ data
(which leaves many questions unanswered – such as
for whom was this data collected? To what ends?),
‘open’ data is never simply open or transparent.
Open government data is generally understood as
the provision of big and small digital data on the
part of government agencies. Readers of this journal
will know that alongside a few critical voices, open
government data is celebrated in the mainstream for
democratising knowledge distribution and research,
invigorating economies, increasing eﬃciency, ensuring
accountability, and operating as a key element in digital
democracy or ‘democracy 2.0’ (e.g., Goldstein and
Dyson, 2013). Open government data is data shared
with no depletion: sharing not in the sense of division,
but giving multiple citizens access to the same thing.
By contrast, we can understand closed government
data as that data which is withheld from public view,
whether in the interests of privacy, diplomacy, or
national security. As ‘close’ brings forth etymological
associations from the old French clore ‘to shut, to cut
oﬀ from’, we can see how citizens are cut oﬀ from the
state’s data, even data they have (perhaps unknow-
ingly) shared. In sharing this kind of data, we have in
eﬀect given it away. Our ‘share’ can never yield. That is
to say, without the interventions of whistleblowers or
hackers, closed government data will never be given the
opportunity to be put to uses other than those deter-
mined appropriate by the state.
In its open formation, government data is deliber-
ately and strategically shared by the collecting agent; in
its closed formation, data is deliberately and strategic-
ally not shared. With respect to closed data, particu-
larly in the case of state surveillance, citizens share data
with a proprietary agent in exchange for the privileges
that come with citizenship. We might, that is, con-
sciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly con-
sider the collection of our GPS data or phone metadata
a fair price to pay for the freedoms, beneﬁts, and pro-
tections that come with owning a British (or Australian,
German, American, etc.) passport.
This pragmatic attitude to sharing with respect to
closed data, the transmission of citizens’ activity to a
veillant other, is echoed in the experience of digital con-
sumers in general. That is to say, users of social media
and search engines are familiar with making trade-oﬀs
between services they want and acquiescence to data
collection. As well as protocological in a technological
sense, then, sharing also needs to be thought as a pol-
itical, cultural, and industry standard. That is to say, it
‘frame[s] the terms and parameters by which elements
of a system interact and behave’ (McStay, 2014: 5).
As I state above, sharing is not something we do
after possessing data, but is the basis on which having
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any relation with that data can be possible at all. All of
which does not necessarily indicate that the data we
have shared is digested and absorbed, and immediately
put to work by any surveillant agent. Rather, to borrow
the words of Gus Hunt, the CIA’s Chief Technology
Oﬃcer, it indicates that ‘collect[ing] everything and
hang[ing] on to it forever’ (see Ingram, 2013) relies on
the idea that the archive is ‘structurally speculative’
(Andrejevic and Gates, 2014). The uses to which
collected data will be put and the meanings it will be
given are dependent on future algorithms and political
concerns. This means that in a networked era, we are
always already sharing without any actor in the system
necessarily knowing precisely why. The principle of
sharing overrides any uncertainty over the uses to
which shared data can be put. Such a condition is obvi-
ously in the interests of commercial and state surveil-
lance that, in general, currently have monopolies on
accruing economic or security value from big, aggre-
gated archives of data.7
While it might seem as though closed government
data is open data’s evil twin, open government data is
not excluded from this veillant assemblage. All shared
data mobilises a politics of visibility, a demand to align
with a political and ethical distribution of the digital
sensible. While the imperative may not be as strong
when compared with the dataveillant capacities of the
state, open government data initiatives, about which
I will provide more detail below, also involve veillance
because the sharing of data includes a call to watch and
act upon that data – we are envisioned, watched, ima-
gined as entrepreneurial and auditing viewers or sub-
jects. Within a logic of shareveillance, both closed and
open data contribute to the construction of an anti-
politicised data subject and public. The next section
will consider how shareveillant subjectivity is produced
in the context of the state rather than commercial prac-
tices (though obviously this distinction is undermined
by the interdependence between some governments and
tech companies as well as the ways those companies can
sometimes challenge, exceed, transcend, or evade
nation state legislation) by looking at two instanti-
ations: the national security dataveillance revealed by
Edward Snowden, and the open government data ini-
tiatives implemented by the UK government.
‘Closed’ data; securitised veillance
The data collected by the NSA, GCHQ, and other
security agencies around the globe is mostly experi-
enced as ‘closed’: inaccessible to those without security
clearance. Before Snowden revealed the programs
implemented to collect communications data and meta-
data – programs such as PRISM, which, since 2007,
permitted the NSA to access data from service
providers, and Tempora, which saw GCHQ placing
interceptors on ﬁbre-optic cables that handle Internet
traﬃc in and out of the UK – the programs, too, were
closed, secret, opaque. That is not to say that there were
not all kinds of secretions regarding those practices:
details or speculations erupting now and again into
the public sphere through reportage, whistleblowing,
or popular cultural representation (what Tim Melley
refers to as ‘the covert sphere’ [2012]). Rather than
focus on the content of the revelations and whether
such news really was new, however, what I am inter-
ested in is the conceptual apparatus that was available
to those who wanted to resist or challenge this aspect of
the shareveillant assemblage.
Though domestic protests were subdued, calls to end
the NSA’s activities, as evidenced on the banners held
at the march on Washington in October 2013, were
expressed as an ‘end to mass spying’.8 Exercising peo-
ple’s imaginations and oﬀending their constitutional
rights, was the suggestion that their own government
had the ability to see them and their actions with-
out their knowledge or explicit consent. While many
would agree that this move towards ubiquitous com-
munications surveillance is, indeed, something to resist,
the appeal to ‘privacy’ falls rather ﬂat. Privacy is like
the light we see from an already dead star. We cling to
it even though we live in what our digital conjuncture
has essentially rendered a post-privacy paradigm. This
does not mean that the concept of privacy is no longer
important: it still organises legal processes, rights-based
debate, and common understandings of our own sense
of self. In some ways, as Andy McStay points out:
many social changes since the industrial revolution
involve a net increase in privacy, be this less familiarity
with our neighbours, more geographically dispersed
family arrangements, working away from home,
weakening of religious authority [. . .] greater possibility
of children having their own bedrooms, increase in car
ownership (versus public transport). (2014: 2)
Yet, the risk of still appealing to privacy in an era of
ubiquitous dataveillance and closed, securitised data, is
that it reduces rather than increases political agency
precisely because it misunderstands the subjectivity in
question and because privacy claims are particularly
weak when it comes to collective politics. It cannot
redistribute the digital sensible.
To take the ﬁrst of these issues, the appeal to privacy
in the wake of the Snowden revelations misreads the de-
individualising character of mass covert data mining.
The fear expressed on the banners and placards of the
poorly attended protests is that the state sees the crowd
as individuals; a mass that is made up of many ‘I’s, the
privacy each of which has been infringed. The concept
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of privacy imagines a state violating the rights of a fully
self-present liberal citizen. But the way in which data
mining works means that it is not particularly inter-
ested in the actions of individual citizens except in as
much as those citizens are data subjects: how they con-
tribute to a background pattern upon which an evolu-
tionary algorithm can work to recognise minority
anomalies. As Clough et al. write:
In the case of personal data, it is not the details of that
data or a single digital trail that is important, but
rather the relationship of the emergent attributes of
digital trails en masse that allows for both the broadly
sweeping and the particularized modes of aﬀective
measure and control. Big data doesn’t care about
‘‘you’’ so much as the bits of seemingly random info
that bodies generate or that they leave as a data
trail . . . (2014: 154)
Nova Spivack, in an article infused with techno-
utopianism, puts it slightly diﬀerently: ‘We are noise,
not signal’ (2013). While implicitly conﬂating transpar-
ency and surveillance, Spivack invokes this argument to
excuse the NSA’s data scraping: aligned with the
common mantra that if you have done nothing
wrong, you have nothing to fear from surveillance.
It also points towards our delimited role within the
shareveillant assemblage read from the perspective of
closed data.
The oﬀence, I suggest, is less the intrusion into
personal space and more the anti-political act of only
imagining the public as an aggregated dataset. It is not
that citizens are being spied on that is of most concern
in this view, but that unless their actions are ﬂagged
up as extreme outliers, they are not considered
fully formed political agents worthy of anything more
than bolstering an algorithm for data analysis. Rather
than being of comfort, the fact that citizens only count
in terms of their role as ﬂat data has an eﬀect on
the scope of political agency (even if this is only an
imagined agency), and the possibilities therein
that this implies for eﬀective, counter-hegemonic col-
lective action. The political is eﬀectively disavowed by
shareveillance.
To take the second critique of privacy – that it is a
weak foundation on which to build collective action – it
is one not tied to the digital/Big Data turn, but it is
nevertheless a critique that has been given a new inﬂec-
tion within that context. Privacy has been subject to
critique from the Left for its connections with individu-
alism, the perpetuation of oppression, and property. To
call on the right to privacy is to frame the debate in
terms of an individual’s right to limit the access other
people, the state, or commercial entities might have to
her ‘content’ (data, thoughts, feelings, information,
communications) at any time. It reinforces a sense of
a self that lives in political isolation. Therefore, even
when people coalesce around privacy concerns, step
into the light of the demos, they do so in order to
insist on their right to step back into the apolitical
shadows of individualism, away from the possibility
of collective creativity or an identity-in-common.
In short, privacy claims are ill-equipped to funda-
mentally challenge the dataveillance being conducted
and its essentially uni-directional sharing of informa-
tion that contributes to the shareveillant subjectivity I
am outlining. But closed data and opaque data prac-
tices are only one half of the story.
Open data
The provision of open data is a professed concern and
commitment for many liberal democracies today.9 The
UK’s open government data portal, data.gov.uk, is
exemplary in this regard, providing public access to
many diﬀerent datasets produced by government agen-
cies.10 There are many reasons to applaud transparency
measures such as this, especially when compared with
closed regimes in which extreme forms of corruption
are endemic. And yet, this might be an inﬂammatory
comparison, or at least a false construction of the issue.
For within ostensibly ‘open’ liberal democracies, we
must ask which forms of openness take precedence in
any particular era, and what kind of subjectivities do
they produce. Regions wishing to make the move
towards more open forms of society and state often
look to those dispositifs already in operation elsewhere
and thus forms of openness, and the political settle-
ments they compound, travel.
In sharing its datasets with citizens, the state adds
to the interpellation of shareveillant subjects. ‘Hey,
you there!’ (Althusser, 1971: 174) becomes ‘Hey, you
there! Come closer and watch’. The subject not only
turns to be seen, but also to become vigilant. The
shareveillant subject is surveilled (possibly without
her knowledge, given all I have said regarding data-
veillance), but also has to be seen to be seeing. More
accurately, the shareveillant subject is asked to see
through: the transparency of the state is the interface
that hails us and we cannot but occupy the position
(whether we feel technically capable or not, whether
we perform the function or not) of auditor, analyst,
witness. In the process, a characteristic of neoliberal
logic is performed: the subject is bequeathed responsi-
bility without power. She is given the responsibility to
watch without the expertise to know what to look for,
nor the power to act in a meaningful way on what
might be found. As Isin and Ruppert recognise, ‘acts
of sharing place unique demands on citizen subjects of
cyberspace’ (2015: 88).
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The unique demand is not only to look, for even
while this call to be vigilant is made, the reach widens
to draw in unelected mediators: app developers, data
visualisers, etc. Data entrepreneurs step into the ideo-
logical call to help fulﬁl the demand to watch, to see
(through) the state. The ‘datapreneurs’ happily perform
this function and are also responding to a hailing: to
help operationalise the new ‘data economy’. This is
because the provision of open government data is
fuelled not only by its purported social value, but also
its economic value. In an attempt to stimulate and sup-
port activity in this economy, governments of devel-
oped and developing nations promote and sponsor
‘app-jams’ and ‘datapaloozas’. The ‘datapreneur’ is
the key ﬁgure in the success of the open data economy,
as the actor who must harness the potential of the data
to create value from raw datasets. For the state and
datapreneur alike, data is conﬁgured as a resource
ripe for mining and commodiﬁcation.
Where does this leave the shareveillant subject? At
once asked to watch the newly transparent state, with
all its data organs on display, and to rely on the med-
iating and translating functions of a datapreneur to do
so, this subject is one whose relationship to government
is shaped by the market. Neoliberal ‘capitalist realism’
(Fisher, 2009) has long ensured the public acquiescence
to and accommodation of the marketisation of many
aspects of social and political life, from education to
health. What is new here is that the market gets to
decide the very stakes of the political. I am arguing
that the reliance upon data mediators or datapreneurs
to make the transparency of the state meaningful and
legible means that the market decides the distribution
of the sensible – what we can know, see, hear, touch,
encounter. In terms of sharing, only those government
open datasets that can be made to yield proﬁt (in some
form) will be translated by datapreneurs in formats that
non-specialist citizens can receive, understand, and
act upon.
The shareveillant subject is required to be vigilant in
order to be an engaged citizen. Immediately, however,
this impossible vigilance of the open state is acknowl-
edged, and mediators are called upon to select and
package information. This means that vigilance is
always watchfulness not of the fully transparent state,
but of selected mediations brought forth. Transparency
is obscured by its own impossible glare – only the
data that the market has primed us to want (usually
data that can help us make apparently ‘informed’
choices in a complex public–private landscape)
assume the face of state transparency in the data econ-
omy. The risk is that it becomes increasingly diﬃcult
to participate in and navigate the state outside of
these commodiﬁed, shaped, and edited forms of aggre-
gated data.
Interrupting shareveillance: New cuts
The shareveillent subject, then, is rendered politically
impotent from (at least) two, not necessarily distinct,
directions. In the face of state and consumer dataveil-
lance, the subject’s choices (whether that be with whom
to communicate or what to buy) are compulsorily
shared to contribute to an evolving algorithm to
make advertising, say, or governmentality, more eﬃ-
cient, targeted, precise. The public is conﬁgured as
rich Big Data rather than a network of singularities
with resistant potential. Open government portals
share the state’s data with subjects and, in doing so,
responsibilise and isolate individuals and thus disavow
the legitimacy of collective power. In addition, this
form of accountability produces a limited relation
with the information provided. In monitoring the
granular transactions of government – in the form of
UKMPs expenses, for example, now available after the
scandal of 2009 at www.mpsallowance.parliament.uk –
the armchair auditor is only permitted to spot anoma-
lies or aberrations in a system she has to otherwise
acknowledge as fair. This form of sharing, of openness,
anticipates a limited form of engagement and response.
And, as I have outlined above, even this armchair audi-
tor able to engage with ‘raw’ data is largely a ﬁction
produced by the rhetoric of open government; the cru-
cial role that datapreneurs and app developers play in
mediating data means that the state’s sharing and the
subject’s share of the state are subject to market forces.
I want to be clear that I am not imagining a once
fully agential, self-present, sovereign political subject
who has now been supplanted by this shareveillant ver-
sion, compromised by marketised, securitised, and neo-
liberal apparatus such as algorithmic governmentality
and open data portals. Political agency (and presence
and sovereignty) has always been limited by structural
and relational conditions as well as the ﬂuidity, frag-
mentation, or fracture of psyches and subjectivities
identiﬁed by discourses from psychoanalysis to decon-
struction. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the
particular discursive-material conditions that curtail
political agency – render it beside the point, undesir-
able, unnecessary – alongside those other inescapable
metaphysical limitations. For it is from here that we
can more fully understand the particular distribution
we are faced with.
It is one thing, of course, to diagnose a condition,
and quite another to prescribe a remedy. If one accepts
that shareveillance supports a political settlement not
conducive to radical equality, and that a more equitable
distribution is something to strive for, how might share-
veillance be interrupted? I would like to oﬀer one pos-
sible strategy, while recognising that there will be
others. The conceptual framework for my interruption
hinges on the etymology of ‘share’. From the Old
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English, scearu – ‘a cutting, shearing, tonsure; a part or
division’ – the root of the meaning of ‘share’ apropos
‘portion’, to the term scear, with respect to plowshare,
meaning, simply, ‘that which cuts’, cutting clearly res-
onates within the concept and practice of sharing.
Rather than merely a happy coincidence or useful
device, the fact that a cut lies at the heart of sharing
attunes us to the ‘violence’ of any distribution.
This focus is certainly supported by Rancie`re’s fram-
ing of the distribution of the sensible, at least in certain
translations:
I understand by this phrase the cutting up [decoupage]
of the perceptual world that anticipates, through its
sensible evidence, the distribution of shares and social
parties [. . .] And this redistribution itself presupposes a
cutting up of what is visible and what is not, of what
can be heard and what cannot, of what is noise and
what is speech. (Rancie`re, 2004b: 225)
What share we have of resources, as well as the mode
of sharing, fall along the lines of a particular distribu-
tion or cut. The way we share, the conditions and deci-
sions underlying how and what we share, what I am
calling the ‘cut’, create a certain distribution. As well as
the appearance of cutting in the etymology of ‘share’,
I am also mindful of Sarah Kember and Joanna
Zylinska’s productive use of it in Life After New
Media (2012). Thinking about mediation as a ‘complex
and hybrid process’ that is ‘all-encompassing and indi-
visible’ (Kember and Zylinksa, 2012: xv), the authors
draw on a range of thinkers from Henri Bergson to
Karen Barad and Jacques Derrida to Emmanuel
Levinas, to imagine cuts (into the temporality of medi-
ation) as creative, ethical incisions and decisions. Thus,
photography, to take their most potent example, is:
understood here as a process of cutting through the
ﬂow of mediation on a number of levels: perceptive,
material, technical, and conceptual. The recurrent
moment of the cut – one we are familiar with not just
via photography but also via ﬁlm making, sculpture,
writing, or, indeed, any other technical practice that
involves transforming matter – is posited here as both
a technique (an ontological entity encapsulating some-
thing that is, or something that is taking place) and an
ethical imperative (the command: ‘‘Cut!’’). (Kember
and Zylinska, 2012: xvii–xix)
This leads Kember and Zylinska to ask what it
means to ‘cut well’ (2012: xix). It is a question that
every artist must ask themselves and practice, they
argue. This imperative to cut well extends to all acts
of mediation (any other technical practice that involves
transforming matter), including the kinds of practices
that mediate data that I engage with in this article.
Obviously, not everyone who works with data is an
‘artist’ in the way we would traditionally understand
that term. But if we draw on aesthetics in the
Rancie`rean sense – as a distributive regime that deter-
mines political possibilities – then we can begin to see
diﬀerent decisions being made as to how and when to
cut into data and what to reveal or conceal about that
decision-making process itself, as ethical or unethical.
When we are cut oﬀ from our data (as is the case
with closed data), we are not given the opportunity to
make our own cuts into it. Equally, if the cut of data is
such that we can only engage with it in ways that sup-
port a political settlement we might not agree with – if
what might appear as an ethical provision of data in
fact supports or makes more eﬃcient an unethical
system – then our cuts are determined with strict par-
ameters. To cut (and therefore share) diﬀerently, to cut
against the grain, we have to interrupt the strictures of
shareveillance.
There are many interruptive cuts I could draw on –
hacking, decentralisation, encryption, anonymity – but
some of the most interesting can be encapsulated by the
term ‘data obfuscation’. Finn Brunton and Helen
Nissenbaum (2015: 1) identify a number of diﬀerent
obfuscation strategies that all demonstrate a ‘deliberate
addition of ambiguous, confusing, or misleading infor-
mation to interfere with surveillance and data collec-
tion’. In their book, Obfuscation: A User’s Guide for
Privacy and Protest, Brunton and Nissenbaum consider,
among other technologies, the Onion Router (TOR),
which allows for online anonymity through a combin-
ation of encrypting communication and relaying it via
several nodes on the Internet to obscure the source and
destination; TrackMeNot, a browser extension that
ﬂoods search engines with random search terms to
render algorithms ineﬀective; and the privacy plug-in,
FaceCloak, which encrypts genuine information oﬀered
to Facebook so that it can only be viewed by other
friends who also use FaceCloak. Crucially, each inter-
rupts the idea of sharing as the default.
As a particularly decisive cut that utilises obfusca-
tion, I will brieﬂy outline a project published in 2016 by
artist Paolo Cirio called ‘Obscurity’.11 In the US, the
publication of police photographs, or ‘mugshots’, of
arrestees is legal under Freedom of Information
and transparency laws in most states. Websites scrape
mugshots that have been published elsewhere, some-
times on sites belonging to law enforcement entities,
and republish the photographs, requesting money
from the arrestee to remove the picture and details. In
‘Obscurity’, Cirio and his collaborators have developed
a programme to clone and scramble the data available
on mugshot industry websites such as Mugshots.com,
Justmugshots.com, and MugshotsOnline.com. Using
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almost identical domain names to these sites, Cirio’s
clone sites show hazy faces that are impossible to iden-
tify and names that have been changed. While Cirio is
most concerned with the right to be forgotten, as the
issue has come to be referred to in the EU after the
landmark case in 2014 that ensured search engines
like Google are subject to the existing EU data protec-
tion directive, we can also read this project as one that
exposes the risks inherent to ‘sharing’ (the risk of abuse
and exploitation) and the limits and failures of some
transparency initiatives. In addition, with the concerns
of the current article in mind, the mugshot industry can
be thought of as aping, cynically and darkly, the work
undertaken by datapreneurs to transform open data
into proﬁtable forms. After all, the websites Cirio is
protesting against indeed have an entrepreneurial, cre-
ative approach to re-purposing open data.
By cutting into shareveillance, Cirio demands that
incarceration be seen not as a decontextualised, indivi-
dualised problem, but as a collective, social issue for
which we all have responsibility. The project exposes
the unethical cut of shareveillance with respect to a
particular socio-political issue: how, in this case, mug-
shot websites share data in such a way that presents
incarceration as an asocial issue, while in the process
performing a second tier of punishment (shaming and
extortion) beyond any lawfully imposed penalties. The
project asks us to see incarceration in terms of the pol-
itical economy as well as the stratiﬁed and stratifying
nature of the carceral state. It cuts into this particular
distribution in order to share anew. Creative interrup-
tions of shareveillance can make ethical cuts, and in the
process, show up the cuts/incisions that have con-
structed the neoliberal securitised settlement of which
shareveillant subjectivity is a part.
As well as the digital experiments with obfuscation
outlined above, cutting into or interrupting shareveil-
lance might include:
. imagining forms of transparency that do not just
make already inequitable systems more eﬃcient;
. not using the morally inﬂected language of sharing
when it comes to personal data (see Prainsack,
2015); it is not always ‘good’ to share;
. insisting on a right to opacity rather than privacy.
In order to help with the last of these, I turn to the
late philosopher E´douard Glissant. In a very diﬀerent
context to that with which, this article is engaged,
Glissant coined the term a ‘right to opacity’. Glissant
is writing about an ontological condition of minoritar-
ian subjectivity that resists the demand to be knowable,
understood, and transparent in the racialised terms
already set by the dominant group. Unlike privacy,
which rests on a subject who, though is knowable in
principle, has chosen to keep certain things from view,
opacity insists on the irreducible unknowability of the
subject. Inspired by this concept, while respecting its
origins in work on race, a right to opacity in the digital
context would mean the demand not to be reduced to,
understood as, consume, and share data in ways
deﬁned by state or consumer shareveillance. Rather
than acts of publicity such as legal marches or on-line
petitions, I want to argue that we need to meet the
pervasive protocols of inequitable dataveillance
employed by the securitised state, and the logic of
shareveillance with forms of illegibility: a reimagined
opacity that allows for a politicality currently denied
to subjects to take meaningful forms.
The identity of the shareveilled data object/neo-
liberal data subject cum dataset is not one that is
allowed to interact with data in the creation or explor-
ation of radical collective politics. A right to opacity
could be mobilised in order to refuse the shareveillant
distribution of the digital sensible. It might oﬀer an
opportunity to formulate a politics based not on priv-
acy, but rather, opacity; which could, in turn, clear the
way to imagine a community forming openness and
exchange rather than its shareveillant manifestation.
It is not a case of deciding whether to accept open
data as a compensation for opaque data collection
practices and closed data, but of understanding the dif-
ferent ways in which all are part of the shareveillant
logic of digital governmentality, and recognising the
new epistemological and ontological calls made upon
shareveillant subjects.
A right to opacity means, here, the right to refrain
from sharing in, and being understood according to a
shareveillant distribution we may not support. In this
re-attunement, we can reimagine closure as opacity and
politicise sharing by understanding it as a series of deci-
sions and cuts. In a conjuncture that places a premium
on the knowability and surveillability of subjects, in
which everyone must share their data, come forth and
be understood as data, these experiments and imagina-
tive cuts become ethical, political acts.
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Notes
1. The UK’s Open Data Institute, which works with public
and private entities promoting innovation through open
data, defines closed data as: ‘Data that can only be
accessed by its subject, owner or holder’ (Broad, 2015).
2. Digital Keywords is a forum hosted by the University of
Tulsa, which took inspiration from the 40th anniversary
of Raymond Williams’ (1976) Keywords: http://culturedi-
gitally.org/digital-keywords/. The entries are to be pub-
lished in a forthcoming collection for Princeton
University Press (Peters, 2016).
3. See Chambers (2012) on the different incarnations of this
term – ‘subjectivation’ and ‘subjectification’.
4. Armitage made these comments during a response he
gave at an event centred on James Bridle at The
Whitechapel Gallery, ‘Systems Literacy’, 29 January
2016.
5. Private correspondence with Tom Armitage, 9 February
2016.
6. https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/
7. It is important, of course, to acknowledge that there is
also social value to be gained from the sharing of some
Big Data, such as genomics data, and other health-related
data.
8. See, for example, Reuters’ footage at: http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-security-protest-idUSBRE99P0B4201
31027
9. The Open Government Partnership currently has 69 par-
ticipating countries, not all of which, it should be noted,
could be described as liberal democracies, at various
stages in implementing open government plans: http://
www.opengovpartnership.org/countries
10. The UK site was launched in 2009, the same year as the
US government transparency portal, data.gov. However,
the latter’s funding was cut in 2011 from $35m in 2010 to
just $8m (Fiveash, 2011).
11. https://obscurity.online
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